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Abstract
We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations
are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political
pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the
agreement is actually implemented; and (iii) negotiated commitments can be implemented only if
they are self-enforcing.  We thus consider the design of self-enforcing trade agreements among
governments that acquire private information over time.  In this context, we provide equilibrium
interpretations of GATT/WTO negotiations regarding upper bounds on applied tariffs and
GATT/WTO escape clauses.  We also provide a novel interpretation of a feature of the WTO
Safeguard Agreement, under which escape clause actions cannot be re-imposed in an industry for
a period equal to the duration of the most recent escape clause action.  We find that a dynamic usage
constraint of this kind can raise the expected welfare of negotiating governments.  
*Bagwell: Columbia University (Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory in the
Department of Economics, and School of Business) and NBER; Staiger: The University of
Wisconsin at Madison (Department of Economics) and NBER.  For helpful comments, we thank
participants at The University of Chicago Conference on International Dispute Resolution.  We
thank the NSF (SES-0214021) for providing funding.  All errors are ours.
1I.  Introduction
Efforts to implement international agreements typically take place in the presence of three
broad features.  First, negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of
substantial uncertainty over the state of the world that will exist at the time the agreement is actually
implemented.  Second, at the time of implementation, governments are privately informed about
specific features of the realized state of the world as these features apply to them.  And third,
negotiated commitments will be implemented successfully only if they are self-enforcing.
These three features are readily apparent in the context of international market access
agreements negotiated within the GATT/WTO.  For example, the market access commitments
negotiated in the most recently completed (Uruguay) round of GATT/WTO negotiations were
agreed to in 1994, but many of these commitments were not scheduled to be fully implemented until
10 years later: the elimination of the system of textile quotas known as the Multi-Fiber Agreement
(MFA) is a prominent and instructive example.  It seems fair to say that the state of the world that
exists now that these commitments are due to be implemented was unknown at the time that
governments originally signed on to these commitments.  There also seem to be many examples
(e.g., the continuing political debate in the United States over the appropriate response to the cost
inflicted on U.S. textile workers of the elimination of the MFA at the end of 2004) that confirm the
observation that it is difficult for affected trading partners (e.g., China) to know with precision the
extent of political pressure that another government (e.g., the United States) actually faces at the
time of implementation of its market access commitments.  And finally, it seems widely
acknowledged that a government can be expected to abide by commitments it negotiates within the
GATT/WTO only if and for as long as it sees doing so to be in its self interest (i.e., GATT/WTO
commitments are not meaningful unless they are self-enforcing).   
In this paper, we suggest that these three broad features can help account for a number of
broad characteristics of the design of the GATT/WTO and of the international commitments that are
negotiated within the bargaining forum shaped by its rules.  We emphasize two such characteristics
that are central to the GATT/WTO.  First, governments do not negotiate precise tariff levels; rather,
the tariff bindings with which governments anchor their negotiated market access commitments in
2the GATT/WTO define upper bounds above which a government agrees not to set its applied tariffs,
and in practice the negotiated tariff bindings do not always constrain the applied tariffs that
governments select (i.e., governments sometimes set their applied tariffs at levels that are strictly
below their associated GATT/WTO bindings).  And second, governments do not negotiate rigid
tariff bindings to which they agree to abide in all circumstances; rather, the tariff bindings to which
governments agree in GATT/WTO negotiations carry with them a variety of escape clauses that can
be triggered under certain circumstances.  As we demonstrate, these broad characteristics – which
reflect choices made by the GATT/WTO member governments concerning both the design of their
bargaining forum and the negotiating outcomes within this forum – follow naturally in an
environment that exhibits the three features described above.  
We undertake our analysis within a simple partial equilibrium two-country two-good trade
model in which governments face political pressures from their import-competing producers and
make choices over the levels of their import tariffs.  Our formal model builds from Bagwell and
Staiger (2001), but we assume here that the degree of political pressure faced by each government
is an iid random variable that is determined each period according to a commonly known
distribution function, and that each government privately observes the realization of its own political
pressure in each period.  We assume further for simplicity that the two governments can undertake
negotiations only once, that they undertake these negotiations under a “veil of ignorance” (i.e.,
before observing present or future realizations of political pressure), and that they then make their
tariff choices simultaneously in each subsequent period after privately observing their realized
political pressure for the period and in light of the commitments they have negotiated. 
We begin by considering negotiations over a rigid tariff binding that can be exogenously
enforced.  This tariff binding could either imply a strong commitment, or a weak commitment.
Under a strong commitment, the negotiated tariff binding specifies the precise level at which a
government must set its (applied) tariff.  Under a weak commitment, the negotiated tariff binding
specifies the maximal level at which a government may set its (applied) tariff.  We characterize
negotiations over both, and establish that: (i) governments prefer negotiating commitments that take
the form of weak bindings over strong bindings; (ii) when governments negotiate commitments that
3take the form of weak bindings, they choose to adopt tariff bindings which are higher than those they
would choose if their negotiated commitments instead took the form of strong bindings; and (iii)
when governments negotiate commitments that take the form of weak bindings, they choose to adopt
tariff bindings which imply that governments with low realizations of political pressure will set their
applied tariffs strictly below the bound level.  
We next consider the enforcement of rigid tariff bindings, focusing on the case of weak
bindings.  We show that, when negotiated commitments are constrained to be self-enforcing: (i) the
self-enforcement constraint does not bind provided that the rate at which governments discount the
future is below a critical level; (ii) for discount rates just above this critical level, the negotiated
tariff bindings must be higher – and the applied tariffs must therefore fall below the bound level with
greater frequency – if the commitments are to remain self-enforcing; and (iii) there can be a critical
discount rate above which governments are incapable of sustaining any commitments in a self-
enforcing agreement, and are therefore destined to remain in the (one-shot) Nash tariff equilibrium.
We then consider the value of introducing an escape clause in some form, as a way to
enhance the ability of governments to benefit from self-enforcing tariff commitments and to expand
the range of discount rates over which self-enforcing agreements are possible.  We model an escape
clause as allowing governments in effect to negotiate two bindings, one (lower) binding to apply
during “normal” times, and the other (higher) binding to apply during “exceptional” times.  Our first
result here is negative: when bindings are weak, tariff commitments with an escape clause can offer
no improvement over tariff commitments without an escape clause (i.e., the negotiation of a single
rigid tariff binding).  Intuitively, the problem is that each government’s private information over its
realized political pressure will always allow it to claim sufficient pressure to exercise the higher
escape clause binding, which it will surely do as it is then permitted to set its applied tariff at or
below the escape clause binding, and so in effect there will only be one binding (the escape clause
binding). 
Our negative result is instructive: what is needed to make an escape clause potentially
valuable to governments in this private-information setting is a cost associated with its use, so that
4exercising the escape clause might be made incentive compatible.  When bindings are weak, the
required cost is absent, and so an escape clause is worthless to governments.  We proceed to
consider several ways in which a cost associated with the use of an escape clause might be
introduced, and ask whether an escape clause in this form could then be useful to governments.  
A first approach is to insist that the escape clause binding is a strong commitment.  The cost
associated with the use of the escape clause is then the cost of being held to an applied tariff at the
level of the escape clause binding.  Evidently, this will be viewed as costly by a government in the
event that the escape clause binding lies above that government’s best-response tariff: this event in
turn occurs for governments that experience relatively low realizations of political pressure.   We
show that this cost allows an incentive compatible escape clause to be designed, and that there exist
escape clauses of this form that might enhance the value of government commitments. Of course,
as we have observed, GATT/WTO commitments do not take this strong form.  One interpretation
of our result is then that introducing strong bindings into the GATT/WTO escape clause could
enhance its value to governments.  We suggest as well that it may also be possible to offer an
alternative interpretation of this result and of the cost associated with strong bindings that underlies
it, by appealing to the literature on trade agreements as devices to help governments make
commitments to their own private sectors. 
A second approach to introduce a cost for invoking the escape clause is to maintain weak
bindings but insist that a side-payment is made to the trading partner when a government uses the
escape clause.  We show that this too can allow an incentive compatible escape clause to be
designed, and that there exist escape clauses of this form that enhance the value of government
commitments.  Again we suggest two interpretations of our result.  The first interpretation is literal:
requiring that a government make cash payments to its trading partners when it invokes an escape
clause can enhance the value of the escape clause to governments by addressing the incentive
compatibility problems that would otherwise arise.  As cash payments between governments have
never been required within the GATT/WTO, this first interpretation indicates a possible direction
for improvement of the design of the GATT/WTO escape clause.  In this regard, we observe that the
“quota rents” associated with Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) are a form of cash payments made
5from the importing country to the exporting country, and so our result lends some support to
GATT’s permissive stance regarding VERs and indicates some discord with the proscription of
VERs introduced by the WTO.  The second interpretation is more suggestive: we observe that it may
be possible to interpret the compensation/retaliation provisions of the GATT/WTO escape clause
as serving a similar purpose to the side-payments in our formal model, and thereby possible to
interpret these provisions as critical for ensuring the incentive-compatible use of escape clause
actions.  We also discuss and interpret distinctions between the GATT and WTO-era escape clause
rules from this perspective. 
A third approach to introducing a cost to invoking the escape clause is to impose a dynamic
use constraint on governments.  We consider a particularly simple form: if a government uses the
escape clause in this period, then it must wait a period before it can use the escape clause again.  We
demonstrate that this sort of constraint can work to address the incentive compatibility problem, and
we show that there exist escape clauses of this form that enhance the value of government
commitments.  We suggest that this may be particularly relevant for the WTO safeguard provisions,
which introduce a dynamic use constraint of this nature.  Our analysis thus provides a first formal
rationale for the dynamic use constraint found in the WTO Safeguard Agreement. 
There are several strands of literature that relate to this paper.  In the legal literature, Sykes
(1991) is closest to our paper, and emphasizes many of the same themes that we emphasize here.
In the economics literature, earlier papers by Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 2003), Feenstra and Lewis
(1991), Rosendorff and Milner (2001) and Herzing (2004) are concerned specifically with the issue
of escape clauses in international agreements.  Recent work by Martin and Vergote (2004) also
explores some related themes in the context of anti-dumping policies.  Also in the economics
literature, the approach to analyzing collusion in the presence of private information developed in
Athey and Bagwell (2001) and  Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) is methodologically related.
We discuss the relationship of our results to these papers at later points in the paper. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section presents the basic model and
defines and characterizes the incentive compatibility conditions in a static setting.  Section III
1 As usual, the partial equilibrium model can be re-interpreted as a general equilibrium model in which there
is an additional traded numeraire good in the background that consumers value in a quasi-linear fashion. 
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derives the optimal rigid tariff bindings when bindings are strong and when bindings are weak.
Section IV introduces the repeated game to consider issues of enforcement.  Section V considers the
value of  an escape clause in various forms.  Section VI concludes.  An Appendix supplies proofs
not included elsewhere. 
II.  The Model
II.1 The Basic Setup
We begin by describing a simple two-country partial equilibrium world of trade in the
presence of political considerations, analogous to that considered in Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
In this world, the domestic (no *) country exports good y to the foreign (*) country in exchange for
imports of good x from the foreign country.1  With  and  denoting respectively the price of
good x and good y in the domestic country market, domestic country demands for goods x and y are
given by  and  respectively, while domestic country supplies of goods x
and y are given by  and  respectively, with associated profit (producer
surplus) functions  and .  And with  and  denoting respectively
the price of good x and good y in the foreign country market, the analogous expressions for foreign
demands, supplies and profit (producer surplus) functions are  , ,
,  ,  and .  Domestic country imports
of x and exports of y are then given by  and
, respectively.  Similarly, foreign country imports of y and exports
of x are then given by  and ,
respectively. 
The government of each country has a single policy instrument, namely, a specific tariff (
for the domestic government and  for the foreign government) that it can impose on its imports.
Letting  be the price received by foreign exporters of x, we then have the following price
expressions that must hold for any non-prohibitive :  and .  Similarly, letting
2Grossman and Helpman (1994) provide micro-foundations to this interpretation. 
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 be the price received by domestic country exporters of y, we then have the following price
expressions that must hold for any non-prohibitive :  and .  We refer to 
and  as the “world” (exporter) prices of x and y, respectively.  Using these relationships, the
market clearing world prices for x and y are determined by the respective market clearing conditions
 and , yielding the market clearing prices ,
,  and  for  and
.  Trade in good x (good y) is prohibited when  ( ).     
Finally, we define the government objectives.  We follow Baldwin (1987) and assume that
each government seeks to maximize a weighted sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus and
tariff revenue in its economy, with a relatively greater weight on import-competing producer surplus
reflecting political economy influences.2  Specifically, let denote the weight placed by the
domestic government on its import-competing producer surplus.  Then the welfare experienced by
the domestic government on its import and export goods is defined as follows:
, and 
.
The domestic government welfare function is then the sum of these two terms.  Similarly,  let
denote the weight placed by the foreign government on its import-competing producer




The foreign government welfare function is then the sum of these two terms.  
Notice that the domestic tariff choice only effects  and , while the foreign tariff choice
only effects  and .  In light of this, we may characterize Nash and efficient choices of  with
reference only to  and ,  and similarly we may characterize Nash and efficient choices of 
with reference only to  and .  In addition, owing to the symmetry across goods x and y in our
model, we may henceforth focus our characterizations on .  Finally, our focus on political economy
pressures in import-competing sectors only implies in turn that only the domestic political economy
parameter  enters into the determination of Nash and efficient choices for .  For future reference,
we record the explicit expressions for  and  in terms of  for given domestic political
economy weight : 
(1)    and 
(2) .
II.2 The Nash Tariff Choices and Efficient Tariff Choices
We next derive the Nash and efficient tariff choices.  Using (1), the first-order necessary
condition for the optimal unilateral choice of  for the domestic government yields
(3) .
The second order condition is satisfied over the entire parameter range , and we note as
well that  is non-prohibitive over the parameter range , reaching the prohibitive level
of 1/6 when .  From (3), it may be confirmed that the domestic Nash tariff takes on a value
of 1/20 when , reflecting the strictly positive optimal tariff of the national-income maximizing
9domestic government in this case, and that the domestic Nash tariff is increasing monotonically in
, reflecting the desire for a higher tariff that is associated with increased weight placed on domestic
import-competing producer surplus by the domestic government.  Using (2), it may also be
confirmed that  is strictly decreasing in  over , indicating that the foreign
government is strictly hurt by a further increase in the domestic tariff provided there is any export
volume from the foreign country (i.e., provided ).  
The internationally efficient domestic tariff choice in our partial equilibrium setting is the
domestic tariff that maximizes the sum of .  Using (1) and (2), we have that 
(4) .
Using (4), the first-order necessary condition for the efficient choice of  yields
(5) .
Again the second order condition is satisfied over the entire parameter range .  Comparing
(3) and (5), we find that  for , and we observe that  for .  That is, the
Nash tariff is inefficiently high as long as political economy forces do not drive the Nash tariff to
a prohibitive level (in which case the Nash tariff is efficient).  Figure 1 depicts the Nash and efficient
domestic tariff levels over the entire parameter range .  To focus our attention on political
economy pressures that are consistent with strictly positive trade volumes, we henceforth restrict our
parameter range to , where  and .  
II.3 Incentive Compatibility
We now assume that the political economy parameters  and  are each drawn
independently from a common distribution with cumulative distribution function  and density
defined over the support .  We assume that each government privately observes
its own political realization but not that of the other government.
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In this private-information setting, an incentive compatibility problem may arise.  For
example, governments may wish to negotiate tariff bindings in such a way as to allow that a
government’s applied tariff may vary with its realized level of political pressure.  Efficiency may
be improved, for example, when a government applies a higher tariff when it experiences greater
political pressure.  The potential incentive compatibility problem is that a government might be
tempted to apply a higher tariff, even when the political pressure that it actually experiences is low.
Here we define and characterize the incentive constraints that rule out this kind of opportunistic
behavior.  For now, we continue to focus on a static model.  In Section IV, we consider the
enforcement of trade agreements and explain how the findings presented here extend to the repeated
game context.
To this end, we define 
; and ,
and observe that  and  for .  Using (1), we may then write  in the
equivalent form .  Anticipating the possibility that an agreement might result
in an applied tariff that is a function of political pressure, we let the applied tariff function be
denoted by .  Given this tariff function, we may define the domestic government welfare (in
good x) that is enjoyed when the realized political pressure is  and the domestic government
“announces” that it faces  (i.e., applies ):
(6) .
The tariff function is incentive compatible if and only if, for all  and , the following
is true:
(7) .
Incentive compatibility of the tariff function  requires that the domestic government
3In the model considered in this section, transfers are not allowed, and so not all non-decreasing applied tariff
functions can be implemented.  We include transfers in Section V.3.
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According to (8), if  is incentive compatible, then  must be non-decreasing in .  Given
that , it follows in turn that  must be non-decreasing in .  Thus, an applied tariff
function  is incentive compatible only if it is non-decreasing.3
III.  Rigid Tariffs
In this section we consider the possibility that governments might negotiate a single tariff
binding that is used (in each sector) regardless of the realized political pressure that each
government faces.  By focusing on a rigid tariff binding, , we thus exclude for now the possibility
that the governments might allow for safeguard exceptions, whereby a government is subjected to
a higher binding under specific circumstances.  We suppose that governments negotiate this tariff
binding once and that the negotiation occurs before each observes its realized political pressure.  As
above, we continue to focus on a static model and defer discussion of the enforcement of trade
agreements until Section IV.  
We consider two forms that the tariff binding might take.  Under a strong binding, the tariff
binding defines the precise tariff that governments must apply under the agreement.  Under a weak
binding, the tariff binding defines the maximum tariff that governments can apply.  An incentive
4There is an equivalent choice of which maximizes with the expectations taken over the foreign
political pressure .  However, since the ex-ante symmetry of our setup ensures that the resulting choices of  and
will be the same, we continue to characterize solutions in terms of the x-sector variables.
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compatibility problem clearly does not arise when bindings are strong, since the particular tariff that
is applied does not depend upon the political pressure that a government experiences.  Likewise,
when bindings are weak, governments are sure to announce their types truthfully: only a government
with sufficiently low political pressure could gain from applying a tariff below the binding, and such
a government can apply its optimal tariff, , by being honest.  In each case, we look for the
tariff binding that maximizes the ex-ante welfare of the two governments, and therefore the tariff
binding that induces applied tariffs that maximize  where  denotes here the expectation
operator and where expectations are taken over the domestic political pressure .4 
III.1 Strong Bindings
Under strong bindings,  defines the precise tariff the governments must apply.  To
characterize the optimal  in this case, we first define  implicitly by .  In words, 
represents the marginal political realization, below which a government sets its tariff above the
efficient level, and above which a government is constrained by the binding  to set a tariff below
the efficient level.  Using (5), we calculate that
.
Observe that .  We next define the expected domestic political pressure in any period:
.




which is identical to (4) with  replaced by .  
The first order condition associated with (9) reduces to 
(10) .
In words, (10) indicates that the strong binding should be set at the level which is efficient for the
expected realization of political pressure.  Letting  denote the rigid tariff with strong bindings that
maximizes , we then have 
(11) ,
which is by (5) simply .   
We henceforth impose 
(A1) .
Comparing (11) to (3), it may be checked that (A1) ensures that .  At later points in the
paper we will appeal to the uniform distribution to characterize specific results.  We observe here
that (A1) is satisfied when  is uniformly distributed over the support  for .   
III.2 Weak Bindings
Under weak bindings,  defines the maximum tariff that governments must apply.  Thus,
when  is a weak binding, the applied tariff  will depend on the realization of political pressure
according to 
.
To characterize the optimal  in this case, we begin by defining implicitly by .
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In words,  represents the marginal political realization, below which a government is
unconstrained by the binding  and sets an applied tariff equal to , and above which a
government is constrained by the binding  and applies its tariff at this level.  Using (3), we
calculate that
.
Observe that ,  if and only if , and  if and only if
.  
We are now prepared to define expected welfare as a function of a weak binding, .  Our
definition reflects the fact that the applied tariff is  when , while the applied tariff
is equal to the binding, , when .  We thus represent expected welfare under weak
bindings as 
(12)   
where we use notation that conditions on  to denote that expected welfare is calculated for the
case of a weak binding at .  
Let us now define the expected political pressure conditional on being constrained by the
binding .  Denoting this conditional expectation by , we have that
(13) .
Using (12) and (13), we may now write the effect of a small increase in  on expected welfare
when bindings are weak:
(14) .
5This conclusion follows since (i)  is strictly increasing, (ii)  is interior and thus exceeds , and
(iii)  for all .  Part (iii) is verified in the Appendix using (Z1) and (Z2). 
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As (14) indicates, the impact of a small increase in  when bindings are weak is only felt
by the part of the distribution of political pressure to the right of (above) .  At an interior
solution for the  that maximizes , we must by (14) have
(15) .
In words, (15) indicates that the weak binding should be set at the level which is efficient for the
expected realization of political pressure conditional on being constrained by the binding . 
We prove in the Appendix that an interior solution exists to the optimal weak binding
problem.  Denoting this solution by  (which we assume for simplicity is unique), we may use the
first order conditions (10) and (15) to conclude that .5  That is, if governments negotiate a
rigid tariff binding, they will set the binding higher if it is a weak binding than if it is a strong
binding.  In fact, it is direct to establish that .  Figure 2
illustrates the position of  and  and these implied rankings.  A second implication is that, when
tariff bindings are weak, they will be set at a level which implies that a range of low-political-
pressure realizations (i.e., ) will cause governments to set their applied tariffs strictly
below the bound level (see Figure 2).  And a third implication is that governments prefer to negotiate
weak bindings.  To see this, note that  gives higher expected welfare than would occur under
weak bindings if  were instead selected.  But  under weak bindings would deliver higher
expected welfare than  under strong bindings (the same welfare for , and higher welfare
for  – see Figure 2).  We summarize with
Proposition 1:  Governments prefer negotiating commitments that take the form of weak bindings
over strong bindings.  When governments negotiate commitments that take the form of weak
bindings, they choose to adopt tariff bindings which: (i) are higher than those they would choose if
their negotiated commitments instead took the form of strong bindings; and (ii) imply that
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governments with low realizations of political pressure will set their applied tariffs strictly below
the bound level.
It is instructive at this point to consider the case of the uniform distribution in more detail.
Recall that (A1) is satisfied when  is uniformly distributed over the support  for .




Using these expressions and (10), (15) and the expressions for  and , it follows that
under the uniform distribution we have unique interior solutions for  and  given by  
; and .
It is now direct to confirm that the ranking  holds in the case
of the uniform distribution, and the statements of Proposition 1 can be readily confirmed as well.
IV.  Enforcement
Thus far, we have focused on a static model and ignored issues of enforcement.  No external
enforcement mechanism exists for the GATT/WTO; instead, trade agreements must be self-
enforcing.  In this section, we thus adopt a repeated game approach.  We begin by describing the
repeated game and the solution concept.  Next, restricting our focus to weak bindings, we show that
the applied tariffs induced by the optimal rigid tariff binding, , can be sustained in a self-
enforcing agreement provided governments are sufficiently patient.  Finally, we consider what can
be done in the presence of governments that lack the required level of patience.
6Symmetric strategies do not depend upon governments’ “names” and are thus interchangeable across
governments.  In other words, when strategies are symmetric, the current-period tariff strategies are permuted across
governments when the governments’ public histories of past tariff selections are permuted.  
7For further discussion, see Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004).
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IV.1 The Repeated Game
The repeated game is informally defined as follows.  In each period, each government
privately observes its political economy parameter, where these draws are iid across governments
and over time.  The governments then simultaneously apply tariffs.  The tariff selections are
publically observed, and then the governments proceed to the next period.  This process continues
over an infinite number of periods, .  
As our solution concept, we use perfect public equilibria (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin,
1994).  We thus allow that a government’s applied tariff strategy in any period t can depend upon
the government’s current political economy parameter and the public history of past applied tariff
selections.  A government’s period-t strategy does not depend upon its private information about its
own past political economy parameters or the tariff strategies that it used in previous periods.
Throughout the paper, we focus further on equilibria in which governments use symmetric
strategies.6  Henceforth, we refer to symmetric perfect public equilibria simply as equilibria.  In this
section and most of the next section, we restrict attention to stationary equilibria.  In a stationary
equilibrium, along the equilibrium path, in every period a single function  determines the tariff
that is applied by a government with political economy parameter .
In our repeated game, an equilibrium must be robust against two types of deviations.  A first
kind of deviation is called an on-schedule deviation.7  Such a deviation occurs when a government
observes that its current political economy parameter is  and applies instead the equilibrium tariff
that is called for when  is observed.  Consider a stationary equilibrium.  A government then
undertakes an on-schedule deviation if it observes  and yet applies the tariff , where 
differs from .  Such a deviation is not observable, as a deviation, to the other government, which
interprets the selection  as indicating that  was observed.  As a consequence, when a
government observes that its current parameter is  and considers an on-schedule deviation, the
8Of course, in non-stationary equilibria, on-schedule deviations must also be unattractive.  In this case, though,
the equilibrium may call for a different path of future play depending upon whether  or  is selected in the
current period.  As discussed in Section IV.4, the described relationship between on-schedule deviations in the repeated
game and incentive compatibility in the static game is no longer valid.  
9The reversion to Nash play is possible even in stationary equilibria, since stationarity is then required only for
play along the equilibrium path.  As noted below, other punishments would lead to qualitatively similar predictions. 
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government simply compares the current-period welfare from selecting  with that from
selecting .  This is the same comparison that is defined in Section II.3 with respect to the
incentive compatibility of an applied tariff schedule in the static game.  Thus, for stationary
equilibria of the repeated game, the applied tariff schedule  does not invite an on-schedule
deviation if and only if the schedule is incentive compatible in the static game.8
A second kind of deviation is called an off-schedule deviation.  A government undertakes
an off-schedule deviation when it applies a tariff that is not called for in equilibrium, for any
political economy parameter  that the government might possibly have observed.  In a stationary
equilibrium, a government undertakes an off-schedule deviation if the government applies a tariff 
where  differs from  for all .  An off-schedule deviation is thus observable, as a
deviation, to both governments.  Once an off-schedule deviation is observed, play has moved off the
equilibrium path, and the governments may then abandon cooperation and enter a punishment phase.
For simplicity, we assume that following an off-schedule deviation governments revert to Nash play
and select their Nash tariffs in all future periods.9  The off-schedule incentive constraint is thus
analogous to a participation constraint.  
Using these concepts, we may preview the analysis that follows.  We assume that
governments negotiate a bindings system at date zero, before learning their respective first-period
political economy parameters.  The bindings system then constrains applied tariffs, and we
characterize the induced applied tariffs that correspond to equilibrium behavior.  In the present
section, we consider the enforcement of the tariffs that are applied under the optimal rigid tariff
binding when bindings are weak.  As noted in the previous section, the on-schedule incentive
compatibility constraint for applied tariffs is trivially satisfied.  The key issue is then whether
governments are sufficiently patient to resist off-schedule deviations and thereby enforce the
10This follows because a weak binding at  yields higher expected welfare than does a weak binding at
.  The latter binding generates an expected welfare of .
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agreement.  In the next section, we consider alternative binding systems in which the on-schedule
constraint plays a more substantial role.  
IV.2 Patient Governments
We characterize here the critical discount factor above which governments can maintain the
applied tariffs induced by the optimal weak binding  in a self-enforcing agreement.  To this end,
we define 
,
and observe that .10  For simplicity, we assume that the alternative
to cooperation is infinite reversion to Nash.  In particular, if a government undertakes an off-
schedule deviation by applying a tariff in excess of the weak binding, then a punishment phase is
entered whereby Nash tariffs are applied for the remainder of time.  Other punishments may lead
to different values for the critical discount factor above which  can be sustained, but the
qualitative features of our results are robust to other punishments.  
Let the per-period value of cooperation with any (not necessarily ) rigid tariff under weak
bindings be 
,
where, as just observed, .  This per-period value of cooperation is received in each period
by each government, since the countries and goods are symmetric and the levels of political pressure
(types) are drawn iid.  Let  be the discount factor with which governments discount the
future.  That is,  where r is the rate at which governments discount the future.  Hence, a
low  is associated with impatient (high r) governments.  The discounted future value of
11A formal confirmation of the latter property is found in (Z6) in the Appendix.
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cooperation under  is then 
  
, 
where .   Figure 3 depicts all that can be said in general about .  In
particular, as Figure 3 illustrates,  takes its maximum value at  and takes a value
of zero at .  The slope of  is also zero at  and .11  But without further
restrictions on the distribution of ,  can be convex/concave, non-monotonic and even
take on negative values between  and .   
Next we consider the one-period incentive to cheat.  When a government considers cheating
on the agreement, it knows its realized political pressure (type) for that period.  Fix any
.  If , then the government applies the tariff , and so the incentive
to cheat is zero.  Next, suppose that .  For these types, the binding lies below the Nash
tariff, and so there exists an incentive to cheat by undertaking an off-schedule deviation and
selecting .  We define this incentive as follows: 
  for .
Notice that  and  over the domain .  Therefore, the highest one-
period incentive to cheat is associated with the highest realization of political pressure , and so
preventing this type from defecting from the agreement is necessary and sufficient for sustaining
cooperation.  The associated incentive constraint for a government with realized political pressure 
is 
(16) .
From the explicit expression for , given by
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,
we may conclude that the one-period incentive to cheat for type  exhibits the features depicted in
Figure 4.  In particular,  is decreasing and convex in  for , and takes on
a value of zero and has slope zero at .  In Figure 5, we plot  and 
together.  As the figure illustrates, there exists a critical discount factor  such that (16) is
satisfied at  for all .  Thus, the applied tariffs induced by the binding  can be
supported in a stationary equilibrium, provided that . 
We now introduce some definitions so that our findings may be stated at a more formal level.
First, for , the applied tariffs induced by a weak tariff binding  are defined as
the function  such that  for  and  for .  Second, for a
given , we say that a weak tariff binding  is an equilibrium binding if a stationary
equilibrium exists for the repeated game in which in each period governments select the applied
tariffs induced by .  Third, for a given , we say that an equilibrium binding  is an
optimal equilibrium binding if no other equilibrium binding exists that yields higher expected
welfare.  We now have:
Proposition 2: There exists  such that, for all ,  is the optimal equilibrium binding.
IV.3 Impatient Governments
Let us now suppose that .  What can be done to preserve cooperation?  A natural
possibility is to allow the tariff binding  to rise above .  This will have two effects.  First, as 
is decreasing in  for , raising  will reduce , and this by itself helps to
relax the incentive constraint (16).  On the other hand, increasing  above  must eventually
reduce , since  takes its maximum at  and reaches a value of zero at
.  Still, the level of  is unaffected by small changes in  around , and so for
small changes the first effect must dominate.  We may thus state:
Proposition 3: There exists  such that for all , the optimal equilibrium binding
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is characterized by  where  and .
Proposition 3 captures the notion that less-patient governments may be forced to set a higher
rigid tariff.  One interesting implication in the presence of weak bindings is that, when cooperation
is strained (due to impatience, or other analogous forces), our model predicts that tariff bindings will
be higher, and applied tariffs will fall below the bound tariff level with greater frequency.  It is also
interesting to observe that the ability to maintain cooperation by raising the level of  may not be
possible for  sufficiently far below .  The reason is that, as pointed out above,  can
be convex/concave, non-monotonic and even take on negative values between  and .
Hence, the sustainable level of  can fall smoothly to  as  falls toward zero, but it can also
exhibit discontinuous jumps toward or all the way to  along the way.
V.  The Purpose and Design of the Escape Clause
It is now time to consider the value of introducing an escape clause in some form, as a way
to enhance the ability of governments to benefit from self-enforcing tariff commitments and to
expand the range of discount rates over which self-enforcing agreements are possible.  We model
an escape clause as allowing governments in effect to negotiate two bindings, one (lower) binding
to apply during “normal” times, and the other (higher) binding to apply during “exceptional” times.
Our first result, presented in the next subsection, is negative: when bindings are weak, tariff
commitments with an escape clause can offer no improvement over tariff commitments without an
escape clause (i.e., the negotiation of a single rigid tariff binding).  Intuitively, the problem is that
each government’s private information over its realized political pressure will allow it to always
claim sufficient pressure to exercise the higher escape clause binding, which it will surely do as it
is then permitted to set its applied tariff at or below the escape clause binding, and so in effect there
will only be one binding (the escape clause binding). 
However, our negative result is instructive: what is needed to make an escape clause
potentially valuable to governments in this private-information setting is a cost associated with its
use, so that exercising the escape clause might be made incentive compatible.  When bindings are
weak, the required cost is absent, and so an escape clause is worthless to governments.  We proceed
12If one of the bindings exceeds , then the two-step binding system clearly allows governments to apply
their Nash tariffs, , for all .  This is the same outcome as would emerge under a single tariff binding at .
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in subsequent subsections to consider several ways in which a cost associated with the use of an
escape clause might be introduced, and ask whether an escape clause in this form could then be
useful to governments.  
V.1 Escape Clause with Weak Bindings
Throughout the paper, in any given period, we assume that governments apply their
respective tariffs after privately observing their respective types.  In this context, the specification
of a bindings system has the effect of selecting equilibrium behavior, since an applied tariff that
violates a binding is regarded as an (off-schedule) deviation.  In the present subsection, we consider
a two-step binding system, under which an applied tariff in excess of the highest binding is regarded
as an (off-schedule) deviation.  Focusing on weak bindings, the question that we pose is whether
such a system could ever induce applied tariffs that satisfy (on-schedule) incentive compatibility and
yield higher expected welfare than can be achieved in a system with a single rigid tariff binding.
As anticipated, our answer is negative, since the lower binding then has no real bite.  The analysis
is, however, instructive.  
We establish a negative answer, making reference only to the on-schedule incentive
constraints.  It is thus sufficient to focus on the incentive compatibility constraints that arise in a
static setting.  Equivalently, we may imagine that the discount factor  is sufficiently high, so that
off-schedule constraints are assuredly satisfied (i.e., the highest binding is never exceeded).
We consider a two-step binding system.  This system is described by a “breakpoint” type
 such that types  bind at  (i.e., apply a tariff no higher than ), types 
bind at  (i.e., apply a tariff no higher than ), and , where .12  
Recall from Section II.3 that incentive compatibility can be achieved only if the applied tariff
is (weakly) increasing in .  We now consider what this implies for bindings.  Suppose that .
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Then from above we have .  But then type  would bind at , so that it could apply a
higher tariff, closer to .  Thus, bound tariffs must also increase with : .  We may
therefore state: There does not exist a two-step binding system with .
There are now three remaining possibilities: (a) ; (b) ; and (c)
.  We next observe that, given incentive compatibility, in any two-step binding system,
if , then .  This is because otherwise, type  would bind at , so that it
could apply a higher tariff, closer to .  This, though, rules out case (a) above.  We therefore
have: There does not exist a two-step binding system with .
We next observe that case (b) above would leave no type constrained by , and therefore
only  would be constraining for types above a critical level of .  But this would then be
equivalent to a weak tariff binding set at .  We may therefore state: Any two-step binding
system with  is equivalent to a weak tariff binding set at .
This leaves case (c) as the only possible avenue for improvement.  But this case is also ruled
out by incentive compatibility in light of the weak bindings: type  would bind instead at ,
knowing that it could then apply its preferred tariff, since it could set .  Hence we
have: There does not exist a two-step binding system with . 
Having exhausted all the possibilities, we conclude with:
Proposition 4: A two-step binding system cannot offer any improvement over the optimal weak
tariff binding .
We close this subsection with two remarks.  First, both private information and weak bindings are
key for this result.  If either were absent, then a two-step system could be designed which would
improve upon the optimal weak tariff binding.  And second, the problem is that there is no
mechanism for preventing opportunistic use of the escape clause.  This second observation has also
been made by Rosendorff and Milner (2001) and Herzing (2004) in an environment that can be
13Rosendorff and Milner (2001) and Herzing (2004) consider an environment in which bindings are strong but
where an escape clause is interpreted as providing for the temporary absence of a binding.  In the context of our
discussion above, this interpretation carries with it the same implications as our weak-binding assumption.  
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thought of as analogous to our weak-binding setting.13  In the next three subsections, we consider
different ways of controlling opportunistic behavior by introducing a cost to the exercise of the
escape clause so as to achieve incentive compatibility, and in this way we identify the possibility
that an escape clause can become useful to governments. 
V.2 Escape Clause with Strong Bindings
We next consider a hybrid system where the baseline bound tariff, , is subject to weak
bindings, but the escape clause tariff binding, , can be used only if the binding is strong so that
the government exercising the escape clause must actually apply .  In this case, if , a
government that applies a tariff  such that  undertakes an off-schedule deviation and
induces the Nash punishment in future periods.  Intuitively, incentive compatibility might then be
achieved, since a government now bears a cost when it exercises the escape clause (namely, being
held to the precise tariff level ) whenever  lies strictly above the government’s optimal
unilateral tariff choice .  
To see how incentive compatibility could be achieved under this hybrid system, consider
Figure 6.  For purposes of illustration, we set .  With an appropriate choice of , type 
can be made the “breakpoint” type who is indifferent between  and .  Moreover, as observed
in Section II.3, , and so types higher than  prefer  while types lower than
 prefer .  Of course, as Figure 6 illustrates, it is critical that the binding is strong; otherwise,
the applied tariff (when  is the binding) would be , and no such  could be chosen.     
Notice that the achievement of an incentive compatible two-step arrangement entails a cost:
when its type is high, a government sets its tariff above its best-response level (at least when ),
hurting itself and its trading partner.  Nevertheless, it is possible that governments could gain from
such an arrangement.  For example, suppose  is below , so that governments are not patient
enough to support the optimal rigid tariff with weak bindings, .  Consider again the arrangement
14For a related argument in the context of a model of self-enforcing collusion, see Athey, Bagwell and
Sanchirico (2004).
15For theoretical arguments that government discretion in trade policy can lead to sub-optimally high levels of
protection, see, for example, Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998).  For empirical
evidence, see Staiger and Tabellini (1999), who compare the tariff binding choices made by the United States in the
Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations with the U.S. tariff choices made under the GATT escape clause, and find that the
added discretion associated with escape clause actions appears to lead to tariff decisions that are over-protective from
an ex-ante perspective.   
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illustrated in Figure 6, only now set , and let  denote the implied breakpoint type (i.e., the
type indifferent between  and ).  This arrangement leaves the incentive to cheat
 unchanged for , but it reduces  for .  Moreover, if 
is sufficiently small, then the probability of realizations of political pressure at the level
in the future will be small, and so the impact of this arrangement on  will be approximately zero.
In this case, the off-schedule incentive constraint is relaxed, and such an arrangement might succeed
where a rigid adherence to  would fail.14 
As we have observed, the GATT/WTO escape clause does not take this strong form.  Hence,
one interpretation of our result is that it raises the possibility that introducing strong bindings into
the GATT/WTO escape clause might enhance the value of the escape clause to governments.
Appealing to the literature on trade agreements as devices to help governments make commitments
to their own private sectors, we suggest as well that it may also be possible to offer an alternative
interpretation of this result, and of the cost associated with strong bindings that underlies it.  Under
this alternative interpretation, the escape clause binding is weak but a government operates in an
environment of enhanced policy discretion whenever it invokes the escape clause.  This policy
discretion, in turn, can lead to tariff choices for the government that, while optimal ex-post, are sub-
optimally protective ex-ante.15  Under this alternative interpretation, then, a government that invokes
the escape clause may find itself making tariff choices that lie strictly above its (ex-ante) optimal
unilateral tariff choice, much as under the strong-binding arrangement illustrated in Figure 6.  In
these broad terms, we suggest that the costs of government discretion may provide a way that
incentive compatibility problems that would otherwise plague an escape clause with weak bindings
might be mitigated.
16As above, we focus on the x-sector, and symmetric tariff and transfer specifications are implied for the foreign
government with respect to the y-sector.  
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V.3 Escape Clause with Side Payments
We now consider a slight modification of our repeated game, in which governments may
make transfers to each other at the time that they apply their respective tariffs.  Maintaining our
focus on stationary equilibria, we let  be a transfer function that describes the transfer to be paid
by the domestic government to the foreign government in exchange for the right to impose the tariff
.  The transfer T has no direct efficiency implications, as it merely affects the allocation of
surplus between the two governments, not the total amount of surplus.16  But the ability to make such
transfers does have an important indirect effect on efficiency.  Specifically, as we next demonstrate,
if governments are sufficiently patient, then the fully efficient tariffs ( ) can be implemented
in a stationary equilibrium of the modified repeated game, where in each period along the
equilibrium path the governments adopt a tariff-transfer scheme  with .  
To develop this result, we first show that an efficient tariff-transfer scheme can be
constructed that satisfies the on-schedule incentive constraints (i.e., that is incentive compatible in
a static game).  Our second step is to suppose that governments use this scheme in each period and
then show that no government can gain from cheating with an off-schedule deviation, if
governments are sufficiently patient.  
To begin, observe that the domestic government welfare (in good x) that is enjoyed when the
realized political pressure is  and the domestic government “announces” that it faces  (i.e.,
applies ) will now be given by .  In analogy with (7) in Section II.3, the tariff-
transfer scheme is incentive compatible if and only if, for all  and , the following
is true:
(17) .
In words, incentive compatibility of the tariff-transfer scheme  requires that the
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domestic government can’t do better than announcing its realized political pressure truthfully.
Following standard arguments (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995), the necessary and
sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility of  can be represented as follows:
Lemma 1 (IC): A tariff-transfer scheme  is incentive compatible iff
(i)    is non-decreasing in , and
(ii)   .
Consider, then, .  Since , condition (i) of Lemma 1 is satisfied.  And we may
define  according to condition (ii) of Lemma 1, which using (6) leads to: 
(18) .
We note by (18) that .  We may now state:
Lemma 2: For any , the efficient tariff-transfer scheme  is incentive
compatible.
We now turn to our second step and examine the off-schedule constraint.  We argue that this
consideration determines the intercept term  in the efficient transfer function defined by (18).
To establish this point, we note that, given symmetry, the per-period value of cooperation  is
independent of the transfer .  Hence, analogous to cooperation under the rigid tariff  discussed
in Section IV.2, the per-period value of cooperation under the efficient tariff transfer scheme, ,
is given by 
.
Observe that  is then arbitrarily large as  approaches 1.  
Next we consider the one-period incentive to cheat.  Again as in Section IV.2, when a
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government considers cheating on the agreement, it knows its realized political pressure (type) for
that period.  A novel aspect now arises, however, in that a government can cheat on both its tariff
selection and its transfer payment, if the called-for transfer payment is positive.  To conform with
the GATT/WTO practice of associating escape clause tariffs with the payment of compensation to
affected exporters, we impose the restriction  for , indicating that the tariff-
imposing government pays a non-negative transfer to the exporting government.  Under this
restriction, cheating then means raising the import tariff to  and making no transfer payment
to the exporting government (with the tariff/transfer activity in the export sector unchanged in that
period).  Thus, the one-period incentive to cheat for type  is given by 
.
With these expressions, we may now state the off-schedule constraint for type :
(19) .
The lowest discount factor compatible with the off-schedule constraint for every type, denoted
,  is found by selecting  to minimize , subject to our constraint that
 for .  Recall that, from (18), .  Therefore, since  is
increasing in , it follows that  is found by setting  and is defined implicitly by 
 .
We have thus established:
Proposition 5:  There exists  such that for all , the fully efficient tariffs ( )
can be implemented in a stationary equilibrium of the modified repeated game, where in each period
along the equilibrium path the governments adopt the tariff-transfer scheme .
In effect, the transfer permits the efficient tariff function to be implemented for sufficiently patient
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governments, with the intercept of the transfer  being set to address the off-schedule incentive
constraint and the slope of the transfer being set to address the on-schedule incentive constraint.  
We suggest two interpretations of Proposition 5.  The first interpretation is literal: requiring
that a government make cash payments to its trading partners when it invokes an escape clause can
enhance the value of the escape clause to governments by addressing the incentive compatibility
problems that would otherwise arise, and in principle allow governments to implement fully efficient
tariffs.  As cash payments between governments have never been required within the GATT/WTO,
this first interpretation indicates a possible direction for improvement of the design of the
GATT/WTO escape clause.  In this regard, we observe that the “quota rents” associated with
Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) are a form of cash payments made from the importing country
to the exporting country, and so our result lends some support to GATT’s permissive stance
regarding VERs and indicates some discord with the proscription of VERs introduced by the WTO
Safeguards Agreement.  
The second interpretation of Proposition 5 is more suggestive: we observe that it may be
possible to interpret the compensation/retaliation provisions of the GATT/WTO escape clause as
serving a similar purpose to the side-payments in our formal model, and thereby possible to interpret
these provisions as critical for ensuring the incentive-compatible use of escape clause actions.
Under this second interpretation, our result again indicates some discord -- or at least reason for
caution -- with the WTO’s elimination of the compensation/retaliation provisions associated with
escape clause actions (that meet certain criteria) for the first three years of their use.  An interesting
feature of the WTO Safeguard Agreement, however, is that in permitting governments to impose
escape clause  protection for up to three years without the need to compensate trading partners, a
new constraint on the use of escape clause actions was also introduced: if a government imposes
escape clause protection in an industry for a period of  years, then it cannot reimpose escape clause
protection in that industry for the next  years.  In the next subsection, we consider whether a
dynamic use constraint of this nature can help address the incentive compatibility problem
associated with the use of escape clause protection.     
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We close this subsection by briefly discussing the relationship between Proposition 5 and
the findings of Feenstra and Lewis (1991),  and also Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 2003), Rosendorff
and Milner (2001), Herzing (2004) and Martin and Vergote (2004).  Feenstra and Lewis report a
finding similar to that reported in Proposition 5, in that the fully efficient tariff can be implemented
with a tariff-transfer scheme analogous to ours.  Our result here differs in two dimensions.  First,
Feenstra and Lewis impose an exogenous participation constraint, while our participation constraint
is endogenously determined through the off-schedule constraint (19), i.e., Feenstra and Lewis do not
address enforcement issues.  And second, they restrict the transfer payment from importer to
exporter to be no greater than the tariff revenue collected by the associated tariff, while we impose
only that the transfer payment be non-negative.  Proposition 5 is also somewhat related to the results
of Bagwell and Staiger, with the most important distinction being that the results of Bagwell-Staiger
are not derived in a private-information setting and hence are established without reference to an on-
schedule incentive compatibility constraint.  Rosendorff and Milner and also Herzing observe that
requiring a fixed compensation payment for use of the escape clause (under which the binding is
temporarily absent) can address the incentive compatibility problem, but these papers do not
consider the optimal tariff-transfer scheme when the tariff and transfer can each depend on the
announced state.  Hence, the novelty of Proposition 5 relative to these papers is to characterize the
optimal tariff-transfer scheme when both (off-schedule and on-schedule) constraints are operable.
Finally, in recent work, Martin and Vergote also observe that transfer schemes can induce efficiency
in repeated trade-policy games with private information. Their main focus, however, is on the use
of retaliatory anti-dumping duties as a means of achieving greater cooperation among governments.
 
V.4 Escape Clause with Dynamic Use Constraint
  As mentioned just above, the WTO Safeguard Agreement introduces a dynamic use
constraint that applies to escape clause actions: once escape clause protection is removed, it cannot
be re-imposed in the same industry for a period of time equal to the duration of the most recent
escape clause action.  Motivated by this constraint, we consider in this subsection a rule whereby
the escape clause cannot be used two periods in a row.  The effect of such a rule is to raise the
opportunity cost of using the escape clause, and it might be conjectured that incentive compatibility
could then be achieved as a result.  In this subsection, we confirm that this conjecture is indeed
32
correct. 
We consider a two-state dynamic binding system that involves two tariff bindings,  and ,
where .  The first state occurs if, in the preceding period, a government applied
a tariff  such that .  In this state, the government elected to bind at  in the preceding period.
The second state arises if, in the preceding period, the government applied a tariff  such that 
and .  Here, the government elected to bind at  in the previous period.  In the first state, the
government has flexibility in the current period: it can either bind again at  and thereby maintain
the state, or it can bind at .  In the second state, the government has no choice in the current period:
having bound at  in the previous period, it must now bind at .  To facilitate the comparison of our
two-step dynamic binding system with the analysis above, we impose further that the bindings are
positioned at or near the optimal rigid tariff binding when bindings are weak.  Specifically, we
consider  and  for  and small.  Finally, we assume that the governments begin the
game in the first state.    
As in Section V.1, this system is described by a “breakpoint” type.  In the first state, where
the government has flexibility, the breakpoint type is indifferent between binding at  (maintaining
the state) and binding at  (changing the state).  We denote the breakpoint type by .  A first
observation is that the system as defined requires that .  If instead , then
.  Type  would then strictly prefer to bind at  by applying , since it thereby
enjoys its optimal tariff in the present and maintains future flexibility.  A second observation is then
that  for  but sufficiently small.
With these observations in hand, we may refer to Figure 7.  As illustrated there, in the two-
state dynamic binding system, applied tariffs in the current period are induced as follows.  In the first
state when , the government binds at ; and it does so by applying its optimal tariff, ,
if , and by applying the tariff  if .  In the first state when , the
government binds at ; and it does so by applying the tariff .  Finally, in the second state, the
government must bind at ; and it does so by applying its optimal tariff, , if , and
by applying the tariff  if .  
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We are now prepared to formally define and analyze the two-state dynamic binding system.
There are three equations.  The first two equations characterize the continuation value if last period’s
tariff binding was , which we denote by , and the continuation value if last period’s tariff binding





The third equation characterizes the required indifference of type :
(22)  
This three-equation system has three unknowns: ,  and .  Our next task is to use these
equations  to prove that  does exist, and that it is unique.   
Using , we may manipulate (20)-(22) to obtain
(23) ,
where , , , , and 
.
We prove in the Appendix the following:
Lemma 3: There exists a unique  solving (20)-(22). 
17The associated perfect public equilibrium is symmetric, since governments adopt the same strategy for the
game.  The equilibrium is not strongly symmetric, however: if the governments are in different states at a given point
in time, they will enjoy different continuation values.  See Athey and Bagwell (2001) for a related analysis in which
different continuation values are used to provide truth-telling incentives in a repeated game with private information.
18When  is small, the applied tariffs induced by the two-state dynamic binding system generate
approximately the same expected discounted welfare as do the applied tariffs that are induced by the weak tariff binding,
.  As we show in Proposition 2, the latter give higher expected discounted welfare than would the applied tariffs
induced by a weak tariff binding at .  But a weak tariff binding at  induces the application of Nash
tariffs and thus generates the expected discounted welfare of Nash play.    
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We now consider the existence of an equilibrium in which, along the equilibrium path, the
governments select the applied tariffs induced by the two-state dynamic binding system.  We note
that such an equilibrium is non-stationary: along the equilibrium path, current play is determined
by the state and thus the history of play.17  As (22) reveals, the on-schedule incentive constraint,
which  occurs only in the first state, now reflects a dynamic comparison and is no longer equivalent
to the incentive compatibility constraint of the static game.  With  and , we see that
indifference of type  ensures that higher (lower) types prefer to bind at   (  ).  Thus, the on-
schedule constraint is satisfied by construction.  As before, we specify that an off-schedule deviation
results in a reversion to Nash tariffs in all future periods.  An off-schedule deviation occurs if a
government applies a tariff in excess of ; likewise, a government undertakes an off-schedule
deviation if it is in the second state and yet applies a tariff in excess of .  For  and sufficiently
small, the applied tariffs induced by the two-state dynamic binding system generate an expected
discounted welfare that is strictly higher than that under Nash tariffs.18  Thus, if  is sufficiently
large, the future cost of an off-schedule deviation is then sure to overwhelm any immediate gain
from cheating.  We thus have:
Proposition 6: There exists  and  such that, for all  and , there exists
a non-stationary equilibrium for the repeated game in which, along the equilibrium path,
governments select the applied tariffs induced by the two-state dynamic binding system in which 
and .
According to Proposition 6, sufficiently patient governments can support the applied tariffs
induced by the two-state dynamic binding system as a non-stationary equilibrium of the repeated
19The result holds also if the distribution function is sufficiently close to uniform.  Proposition 7 holds, for
example, under the power distribution, whereby , if  is sufficiently close to unity.
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game.  A remaining question is whether this two-state arrangement generates expected discounted
game welfare that exceeds that which arises under the optimal weak tariff binding at .  Our
finding is as follows:
Proposition 7:  Suppose that the distribution function, , is uniform.  Suppose further that the
discount factor  is sufficiently large that equilibria for the repeated game exist in which
governments select the applied tariffs induced by (i) the optimal weak tariff binding , and (ii) the
two-state dynamic binding system in which  and .  If  is sufficiently small, then the
two-state dynamic binding system generates strictly higher expected discounted game welfare than
does the optimal weak tariff binding, .  
Thus, under further distributional assumptions, if governments are sufficiently patient, the escape
clause captured by the dynamic two-state binding system offers a strict gain for government
welfare.19  In this way, the results of this sub-section provide an economic foundation for the
dynamic usage constraint found in the WTO Safeguard Agreement.  Proposition 7 is proved in the
Appendix.  Intuitively, when the distribution function is sufficiently close to uniform,  is not too
far below , so that the move from  to  is a move toward  for most of the
probability distribution above  (see Figure 7).     
 
VI.  Conclusions
We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements, when (i)
negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future
political pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time
that the agreement is actually implemented; and (iii) negotiated commitments can be implemented
successfully only if they are self-enforcing.  Our analysis thus offers insights with respect to the
optimal design of self-enforcing trade agreements when governments acquire private information
over time. 
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We also provide equilibrium interpretations of specific features of GATT/WTO negotiations.
In particular, we offer interpretations of GATT/WTO negotiations regarding upper bounds on
applied tariffs and GATT/WTO escape clauses.  In our model, governments achieve greater welfare
when they negotiate upper bounds on tariffs rather than precise tariff levels; furthermore, when
governments negotiate the optimal upper bound on tariffs, the observed applied tariffs sometimes
fall strictly below the bound.  This is consistent with the observation of governments that sometimes
set their applied tariffs strictly below their associated GATT/WTO bindings.  Our analysis also
provides a novel interpretation of a feature of the WTO Safeguard Agreement, under which escape
clause actions cannot be re-imposed in the same industry for a time period equal to the duration of
the most recent escape clause action. We find that a dynamic use constraint of this kind can raise
the expected welfare of negotiating governments.
Our interpretation of GATT/WTO escape clauses relies on the assumption that governments
have private information concerning the political pressures they face with regard to trade policy
choices.  We do not dispute that trading partners can observe when a government is facing political
pressure: indeed, we do not need to dispute this, because our emphasis on private information is
appropriate provided only that trading partners cannot verify the extent of that political pressure.
When this is the case, our interpretation of GATT/WTO escape clauses is relevant, and can be seen
as complementary to other efforts to interpret the purposes served by GATT/WTO escape clauses
when conditions are instead verifiable (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 1990, and Sykes, 1991).    
Our formal analysis does not capture the potential role that a dispute settlement body might
play in this context.  At several points in the paper, we suggest that GATT’s approach to escape
clause actions seems more in line with the broad message of our formal analysis than does the
approach taken by the WTO.  However, one possible interpretation is that with the creation of a
more effective dispute settlement body, the WTO seeks to rely more on its newly created legal
system and investigatory powers to force the direct revelation of conditions that would justify escape
clause actions than was possible under GATT’s weaker legal environment.  Whether this is indeed
practical, and if so whether the WTO environment has achieved an appropriate mix between the use
of legal investigative measures and the kind of incentives against escape clause abuse that we have
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we first prove that an interior solution exists to the optimal
weak binding problem leading up to Proposition 1.
Proof (interior solution): To establish the existence of an interior solution
for the optimal weak binding problem, we begin by recording some properties
of the conditional expectation, E(γ | τR), defined in (13):
E(γ | τN (γ)) = Eγ; (Z1)
∂E(γ | τR)
∂τR > 0 for all τ




















The proof of (Z1) is immediate, and (Z2) also follows from straightforward
calculations. A single application of L’Hopital’s Rule yields (Z3), and (Z4) can
be shown to follow from repeated applications of L’Hopital’s Rule.
Next, we consider the derivative given in (14). First, at τR = τN (γ), we
have from (Z1) that E(γ | τR) = Eγ. Further, we find that γE(τR) = 5/4 and
γN (τR) = γ. Thus, by (A1), we have
∂E[Wx +W ∗x | τR]
∂τR > 0 at τ
R = τN (γ). (Z5)
Second, at τR = τN (
_
γ), we have from (Z3) that E(γ | τR) is finite, and of
course γE(τR) is also finite. Since γN(τR) =
_
γ, H(γN (τR)) = 1 and thus
∂E[Wx +W ∗x | τR]
∂τR = 0 at τ
R = τN (
_
γ). (Z6)
Third, at τR = τN (
_
γ), we may diﬀerentiate (14) and use (Z3), H(γN (τR)) = 1
and (Z4), where the latter ensures that ∂E(γ|τ
R)
∂τR
is finite, to find


















Under our assumption that
_





∂2E[Wx +W ∗x | τR]
∂(τR)2 > 0 at τ




By (Z6) and (Z7), we may conclude that E[Wx +W ∗x | τR] obtains a local
minimum at τR = τN (
_
γ). Given (Z5), it follows that E[Wx +W ∗x | τR] has an
interior maximizer, τRw ∈ (τN (γ), τN (
_
γ)). Finally, at the interior maximizer, (15)
must hold. Given (Z2) and (Z3), it follows that E(γ | τRw) <
_





γ. Since γE(τR) is strictly increasing, the interior maximizer, τRw,
must satisfy τRw ∈ (τN (γ), τE(
_
γ)).



























Using (Z9), we observe that β0(
_
τ + τ) > 0 and β(2τ) = γN (τ). For
_





τ and τ ≥ τN (γ), it follows that β(
_
τ + τ) > β(2τ) ≥ β(2τN (γ)) =
γN (τN(γ)) = γ, and β(
_
τ + τ) < β(2
_
τ ) ≤ β(2τN (
_













γ < 0, and
RHS(γ) = δ[Eγ − γ] + β(
_
τ + τ)− γ > 0.
This establishes the existence of a unique solution γ∗ ∈ (γ,
_
γ) to (Z8).
We next show that this solution satisfies γ∗ > γN (τ). To this end, we com-
pute that
RHS(γN (τ)) = [β(
_
τ + τ)− γN (τ)] + δ[1−H(γN (τ))][E(γ | τ)− γN (τ)].
Note that δ[1 −H(γN (τ))] > 0, since δ > 0 and τ <
_





τ) > β(2τ) = γN (τ). Finally, let y(τ) ≡ E(γ | τ) − γN (τ). Observe that
y(τN (γ)) = Eγ−γ > 0 by (Z1), and y(τN (
_
γ)) = E(γ | τN (_γ))−_γ = 0 by (Z3).










γ)) < 0, which is a contra-
diction. Hence, y(τ) > 0 for all τ ∈ [τN (γ), τN (
_
γ)). We may conclude that
RHS(γN (τ)) > 0. The solution thus satisfies γ∗ > γN (τ).
2
Proof of Proposition 7: Referring to (12), we may express the first order
condition as follows:







R; γ) +W ∗x (τR)]dH(γ) = 0 (Z10)
at τR = τRw. Let
N(τ ; γ) ≡ ∂∂τR [Wx(τ
R; γ) +W ∗x (τR)]H 0(γ). (Z11)




N(τR; γ)dγ = 0 (Z12)
at τR = τRw.
When the distribution function is uniform, H 0(γ) = 1/[
_
γ − γ]. Thus, with





γ − γ] > 0. (Z13)
Using (Z12) and (Z13), we thus conclude: for all eγ ∈ (γN (τRw), _γ), there exists




N(τRw + ε; γ)dγ > 0. (Z14)
We now compare the eﬃciency gain oﬀered by an alternative applied tariﬀ
schedule relative to the applied tariﬀ schedule induced by the weak tariﬀ binding
at τRw. Fixing eγ ∈ (γN (τRw),_γ) and ε that satisfy (Z14), we define the alternative
schedule by τA(γ) = τN (γ) for γ ∈ [γ, γN (τRw)], τA(γ) = τRw for γ ∈ [γN (τRw), eγ],
and τA(γ) = τRw + ε for γ ∈ [eγ,_γ]. The schedules diﬀer only for γ > eγ. Thus, by
3



























N(τRw + ε; γ)dγdε > 0.
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